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ABSTRACT 
 
At the end of 2002 or thereabouts the Commonwealth Government will be announcing 
changes to the financing of Australian higher education. The paper addresses the major 
issues, beginning with a brief history of university funding arrangements. This is followed 
by an conceptual analysis of financing models, on which it is demonstrated that the best 
way to manage student charges is with an income contingent loan, such as HECS. 
 
The paper explores some aspects of current university conditions. It is shown that over the 
past twenty years or so there has been a significant decrease in the relative salary levels of 
academics, and that over the last few years staff/student ratios have fallen significantly. 
Some part of the deterioration in conditions can be traced to the implementation of an 
inadequate indexation arrangement for government grants, instituted in 1995. That is, with 
respect to allowing the maintenance of earnings matching average Australian wage 
increases, public sector outlays have been falling. These falls are above and beyond what 
has occurred with the justifiable switch in financial contributions from taxpayers to 
students. Those arguing for some restoration of government support have a point. 
 
 1  A Recent History of Australian Higher Education Financing 
 
1 (a) Introduction 
 
The financing of Australian higher education has undergone radical change since the 
early 1970s. At that time the Federal government provided practically all funding, and 
until the late 1980s there was little political support for change. However, over the last 
decade there has been a very significant move towards greater private contributions, 
particularly student tuition charges.  
 
Further, since the change in federal government in 1996 the levels of student charges 
and the nature of their payment have changed.  There have also been policy moves 
over the last few years promoting greater institutional autonomy and flexibility with 
respect to charging. The current arrangements are unrecognisable compared to those 
in place under the Whitlam Government.  
 
 
1  (b) Fee abolition in 1973 
 
In the early 1970s up-front fees were paid by some students. These were abolished by 
the newly-elected Federal Labor government, in 1973. This policy change had two 
key motives.  
 
First, fees were believed to erect barriers to participation in higher education by the 
poor. Thus their abolition was seen to be important in improving the access of the 
disadvantaged to better lifetime opportunities. Second, fee abolition was symbolically 
important as a reflection of the Labor Government’s social democratic credentials.  
 
The abolition of university fees at this time had no discernible effects on the socio-
economic composition of higher education students
1, for two reasons. First, only a 
small proportion of students (20-25 per cent) paid fees, since the great majority had 
either Teacher’s College or Commonwealth Scholarships. Second, because secondary 
schooling retention rates to the equivalent of Year 12 were very low at the time (less 
than 30 per cent), most prospective students from poor families had left the education 
system well before university entrance became an option.  
 
 
1  (c) The Higher Education Administration Charge 
 
The Coalition Government of 1975-83 made no important changes to university 
financing. However, the Labor Government introduced the so-called Higher 
Education Administration Charge in 1986. 
 
HEAC was an up-front fee and its introduction is a watershed: it introduced universal 
user-pays. The charge was small - $250 (in 1986 terms) – and did not vary with 




                                                            
1  See Reform of Higher Education Financing (the Wran Report), 1988. 
2  See National Institute for Labour Studies (1988).  2 
HEAC was symbolically important in that a user pays perspective had previously 
been rejected by Australian governments of different persuasions for over a decade. 
As well, HEAC showed the intention of several Cabinet Ministers (notably Peter 
Walsh and John Dawkins) to address what they thought was a critical equity issue: not 
charging for higher education is regressive because the subsidy from all taxpayers – 
including the poor – goes mainly to those from advantaged families. The pejorative 
labelling of “free education” as “middle class welfare” was a major theme at the time. 
 
 
1 (d)  HECS 
 
The Higher Education Contribution Scheme, recommended by the Wran Committee 
set up by John Dawkins in 1988
3, was adopted in 1989. This was a universal charge to 
undergraduate students of $1,800 (in 1989 terms), with a unique feature: students 
could defer payment until their future incomes reached a particular threshold, with no 
real rate of interest being charged on the debt. This was the world’s first income-
contingent charge for higher education
4, a policy arrangement that has since been 
adopted or recommended in many other countries
5. 
 
HECS came about because the government wanted to increase higher education 
enrolments but was not prepared to pay for the increased expenditure through 
taxation. Most importantly, “free education” was seen to be regressive and unfair
6. 
 
While many critics of HECS alleged at the time that the new system would have 
major adverse consequences for the access of the disadvantaged, this has not turned to 
be the case. Some part of HECS’ success on this level relates to the significant 
advantages of the nature of repayment, an issue analysed below. 
 
 
1  (e) 1996/97 Budget changes 
  




.  all charges were increased, by around 40 per cent on average.  
 
.  the income thresholds for repayment of the debt were reduced considerably – 
for example, the annual income initiating the first repayment fell from about 
$30,000 to about $21,000 (in 1996 terms).  
 
.  the uniform charge was replaced with three levels. 
 
                                                            
3  Committee for Higher Education Financing (the Wran Report) (1988). 
4  For analysis of the background to HECS, see Edwards (2001). 
5  Income-contingent loan schemes for higher education are now in place in New Zealand, the UK, 
Ghana, and Namibia, and have been recommended by the World Bank, or are currently being 
implemented, in Ethiopia, Rwanda, Hungary and Malaysia.  
6  For further analysis of the background to the policy, see Chapman (1997a). 
7  For analysis of the effects of these changes, see Chapman and Salvage (1997).  3 
.  universities were allowed to set whatever level of fee they wanted for 
undergraduates not accepted under existing HECS quotas.   
 
The most significant direct change to HECS relates to the repayment thresholds. 
Because the whole structure was moved down, all people repaying HECS – most of 
whom had graduated before 1997 – would now pay more in net present value terms, 
because they would have less of the subsidy implicit in an interest-free loan. Chapman 
and Salvage (1997) estimate that this meant an average increase in effective 
repayment obligations of about 10 per cent.  
 
The new three-tier charge structure was set with reference to a combination of course 
costs and what seems to be a presumption of the income advantages of different 
degrees. For example, one of the lowest cost courses (Law) was accorded the highest 
charge, and one of the high cost courses (Nursing) was accorded the lowest charge. 
Interestingly the Wran Report also suggested a three-tier charge structure, but with the 
charges reflecting course costs only
8. 
 
Allowing universities price discretion for additional students was a radical departure 
from centralised fee control. While so far there has been little take-up of this option, it 
represents the most significant movement towards institutional pricing autonomy in 
the history of Australian higher education (Chapman, 1997b). A movement of this 
type, without income contingent payment arrangements, embodies the least desirable 
social and economic features of a higher education financing system, a major point 
now explained in detail. 
 
 
1 (f)  Crossroads, 2002. 
 
Crossroads  signals an opportunity to revisit several areas of teaching funding, 
including: the role of HECS; university price discretion; TAFE; and PELS. In various 
ways these issues are considered further below. Before this is undertaken it is useful 
to consider some basic conceptual issues associated with student financing. This now 
follows. 
 
2  Options for Higher Education Financing: Theoretical Issues 
 
2 (a)  Introduction 
 
Several different policy approaches, currently in operation internationally, are now 
analysed with respect to their social and economic implications. It will be argued that 
a charge is justified, and that by far the best way for students to pay is via income 







                                                            
8  For critical commentary on these changes, see Chapman (1997b).  4 
2  (b) A No Charge System 
 
Many, although increasingly fewer, countries do not charge for higher education. 
What this means can be understood through reference to standard principles, now 
explained briefly. 
 
A role for government is to help ensure the production of optimal quantities of goods 
and services. In some circumstances this requires public subsidies equal to the 
marginal value of the externality associated with an activity
9. 
 
All charging systems implicitly place a value on externalities. For example, having no 
charge suggests that societal benefits at least equal the size of the subsidy, and, 
implicitly, that graduates receive no direct benefits. While there is little agreement on 




The other issue related to not charging for higher education is that of equity. There is 
no doubt that university students are more likely to come from privileged 
backgrounds, and it is also true that graduates do well in the labour market. A no 




2  (c) Up-Front Fees with No Financial Assistance 
 
If there should be a charge, how should it be paid? One possibility would be to offer 
subsidies to universities, but beyond that allow the institutions to charge fees, with 
there being no other financing assistance provided. Such an arrangement would 
unambiguously be poor policy. In this context the critical issue relates to a major 
borrowing problem, often referred to as “capital market failure”. 
 
Some students would not have the resources to pay the fees and would need to 
approach a bank for a loan. However, banks will be reluctant to loan to students 
because of problems associated with default. An education loan is risky for a bank 
because, in the event of default - and unlike with respect to a housing loan - the bank 
has no collateral to sell. This implies that, without assistance, banks will not be 
interested in the underwriting of human capital investments.  
 
Thus prospective students without sufficient financial resources to cover fees will not 
be able to enrol. There will be three important effects: a loss of talent, and thus a cost 
to the whole society; a loss of opportunity to individuals; and a cementing of the 
nexus between family background and a person’s lifetime income, meaning that such 




                                                            
9 The nature and importance of higher education externalities are documented in Chapman and Withers 
(forthcoming).  
10  See Financing Higher Education, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra, 1988.   
11 See Financing Higher Education, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra, 1988, and 
Chapman (1997a).   5 
2  (d) Up-Front Fees with Bank Loans 
 
A possible solution to the capital market problem described above is used in many 
countries and involves government-assisted bank loans to students with low family 
incomes. The most important form of public sector support is the guarantee of 
repayment of the debt to the bank in the event of default. While this seems to address 
the capital market failure, there are several problems.  
 
The first is that students’ access to loans is usually means-tested on the basis of family 
income. This then presumes equal access of individuals to family finances; however, 
those in charge of the distribution of household finances may not have the prospective 
student’s view of the value to them of education. This implies that some prospective 
students who do not qualify for bank loan assistance will not be able to pay fees. If so, 
outcomes will not be optimal. 
 
The second problem is default. For the government this is costly since bank-financed 
student loans default rates are very high
12. And if there is a guarantee that defaults 
will be paid for by the government banks will put little effort into debt recovery. 
Default is very expensive for taxpayers. 
 
Students also face an important default issue. This is that some may be reluctant to 
borrow for fear of not meeting future repayment obligations, with concomitant 
damage to a person’s credit reputation (and thus access to future borrowing, for 
example, for a house). A consequence is that some eligible prospective students will 
not be prepared to take bank loans
13. This problem can be traced, in part, to the fact 
that bank loan repayments are insensitive to the borrower’s financial circumstances. 
 
 
2  (e) Income Contingent Charging Mechanisms 
 
A final approach to student financing involves income contingent charges, such as 
HECS. The attraction of income contingent schemes is that they can be designed to 
avoid all the problems associated with alternative financing policies outlined above
14.  
 
First, there is no concern with intra-family sharing so long as the scheme is universal.  
That is, no students would be denied access through the imposition of means-testing 
arrangements that could exclude some whose parents or partners are unwilling to 
help. 
 
Second, given an efficient collection mechanism, there is no default issue for the 
government. That is, for example, if the tax system is used to collect the debt (and, at 
least for Australia, this is essential because the ATO is the only institution with 
reasonably good information on a former student’s income), it is extremely difficult 
for the vast majority of graduates to avoid repayment. There is a trivial “default” issue 
in that some students will not pay back in full, but this is because income contingent 
                                                            
12  Harrison (1995) notes that in US Propriety Colleges the default rate is as high as 50 per cent. The 
average default rate for student loans is around 15-30 per cent (Wran Committee Report, 1988). 
13  For analysis of this issue see Chapman (1997b). 
14  For theoretical analysis see Chapman (1997a).  6 
systems are designed to excuse some former student’s payments because their lifetime 
incomes are too low
15. 
 
Third, because repayments depend on incomes, there should be no student default 
concerns. That is, once an individual’s income circumstances determine repayment – 
so long as the repayment parameters are sufficiently generous – it is not possible to 
default because of a lack of capacity to pay. 
 
A bottom line with respect to the desirability of HECS relates to access and equity. 
The system has been in operation since 1989, and there is now considerable evidence 
concerning its consequences
16 for both demand for higher education and the access of 
the poor: there have been negligible (or no) effects in both areas. This appears to be 




3  Contemporary Issues in Australian Higher Education Financing 
 
3 (a)  Introduction 
 
What now follows explores a subset of the many contemporary challenges for 
university funding, several of which have been properly raised in Crossroads. First, as 
background, the scene is set through reference to changed levels of financial support 
to higher education over the last decade or so. This suggests that in the absence of 
changes to current trends, universities will find it increasingly difficult to deliver high 
quality services over the next short to medium term. These funding challenges are 
seen by some to promote the case for higher levels of non-HECS public expenditure; 
others see a way out through universities being accorded flexibility to set student 
charges.  
 
This latter issue involves the questions: how much discretion should there be; if some 
price discretion is desirable, what policy framework is necessary to make this socially 
and economically acceptable; and how might it work?  All three issues are addressed 
in what follows. 
 
Third, in 2002 the government improved markedly postgraduate financing through the 
introduction of PELS. The benefits and potential costs of the scheme are considered in 
some detail. 
 
And fourth, TAFE funding issues are examined. In particular, the following question 
is addressed: is there a case for making TAFE charge arrangements more consistent 




                                                            
15  Harding (1993) calculates that the total  repayments remaining uncollected because of the nature of 
HECS would be of the order of 15-25 per cent for the original scheme (when the repayment 
conditions were much more generous for the student  (before the 1996/97 changes)).  
16  See the annual reports from HEC (1990-2000), Chapman and Smith (1995), Chapman (1997b), and, 
most importantly, Andrews (1999). 
17 See Andrews (1999) and Chapman (1997b).  7 
3  (b) Some Important Aspects of the Current Funding Situation 
There are significant financial pressures on higher education, traceable to difficulties 
with enterprise bargaining and diminished public support to universities. Several 
policy reform suggestions are offered, all of which relate to the maintenance and 
expansion of HECS arrangements. 
Figure 1 shows the long-term decline in the relative remuneration of academics. This 
has been of the order of 25 percent since the early 1980s. As a consequence there 
have been increasing difficulties in attracting high quality staff, with implications for 
the delivery of higher education services. 
Figure 1 
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Source: Figures calculated from Academic Salaries Tribunal data (to 1996), 
ANU academic salaries data and ABS AWE series, 6202.0. 
In this context the introduction of enterprise bargaining in the 1990s, with its 
concomitant funding pressures, is important. Since the early 1990s Federal 
governments have embraced and encouraged the enterprise bargaining as the 
industrial relations system for public universities. This has raised some significant 
challenges. 
One is that, unlike in the private sector, there is little capacity to make enterprise 
bargaining operational. In the private sector there are many things a firm can adjust to 
accommodate a change in working relationships. Most obviously, it can choose to 
vary prices, institute profit sharing, or change the level and/or quality of output. 
Universities in an enterprise bargaining situation face the unpalatable problem of a 
fixed pie: they can give a pay rise to maintain the growth in real incomes, but if this is 
done something else must give, such as the lay off of staff. In a context of declining  8 
real government expenditure, enterprise bargaining inevitably exerts pressure to find 
so-called independent funding sources. Enterprise bargaining makes better sense if 
there is an instrument that can adjust to take into account changed economic relations 
between employers and employees. 
An enterprise bargaining system for universities — supported by both major parties 
— has made life difficult in a context of diminishing real grants compared to average 
salary changes. It is arguable that it encourages conflict between staff and university 
administrations, yet leads to few obvious productivity gains. The major point is that 
enterprise bargaining has contributed to funding pressures.  
It is important to note that around 75 percent of universities’ costs are directly related 
to employees’ wages. Figure 2 (from Burke and Phillips, 2001) shows the extent to 
which government outlays have fallen behind the growth in average earnings. By the 
end of 2001 the difference was of the order of half a billion dollars. 
Figure 2 
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Source: Burke and Phillips (2001). 
The government has not adjusted outlays to allow universities to index salaries in line 
with broad community changes in real wages. As a consequence the higher education 
sector has had to find other mechanisms to maintain relative salaries. To not do so 
would make recruitment of high quality staff even more difficult, and risk losing some 
of the best employees. 
Burke and Phillips’ analysis suggests that these funding pressures have had 
detrimental implications for the quality of higher education service delivery. Figure 3 
shows that the number of students per academic staff member has increased from 
around 13 to nearly 20 over last decade. This is not the result of variations in the 
composition of teaching — it is a general phenomenon. It should not be surprising 
given the changes in public sector funding levels juxtaposed with difficulties in 
raising outside revenue. Something had to give.   9 
 
Figure 3 
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Source: Derived from published DETYA data. 
The critical point for policy concerns the implications of these changes for the 
delivery of the social benefits of education. If these depend partly on the quality of the 
higher education experience, the increase in student/staff ratios suggests the potential 
for lower overall benefits from higher education. 
This issue could be resolved in various ways, and some commentators promote 
strongly the case for additional public sector outlays (Chubb, 2002; Marginson, 2001; 
Quiggin, 2001). A different response, supported enthusiastically by the University of 
Melbourne and others, has involved the promotion of university price discretion, 
perhaps with the expectation that this will inevitably mean higher average 
contributions from students. To the credit of these making such a case, and consistent 
with the theoretical analysis offered above, it is suggested that all additional charges 
should be covered by a universal HECS-type of loan. The broad issue of price 
flexibility is now considered. 
 
 
3  (c) Price Flexibility for Universities 
.  The Benefits of Institutional Charge Autonomy 
The above factors suggest that there are now clearly financial pressures on Australian 
universities; if these are not solved through federal government expenditure changes 
something else needs to give. One candidate is the introduction of some (limited) 
institutional revenue autonomy.   10
The broad case for increased higher education pricing autonomy would recognise that 
Australia is now in a situation whereby universities supply services for a large and 
diversified market.  Higher education is no longer elite and small, and there will 
increasingly be opportunities for specialisation in terms of both subject matter and the 
targeting of particular consumers. 
In this context quality and price differentiation promote the case for allowing 
universities to offer services and prices reflecting to a limited extent their 
circumstances and goals.  This would allow more choice for both providers and 
students, and has the potential to improve service delivery.  
Such autonomy would have two effects, the most obvious being that universities 
would have more revenue which would be supplied through higher imposts on 
students
18. Second, so long as most of the additional revenue is delivered directly to 
the university departments there is some potential to promote propitious outcomes, 
such as relative changes in academic salaries to more accurately reflect outside 
opportunities. 
But if universities are to have some discretion over prices, several questions arise. 
They concern the extent to which there should be price regulation, and how such a 
system might work.  
.  Limiting Pricing Autonomy 
There is perhaps now a case for an increase in institutional autonomy with respect to 
pricing. Universities could offer different charges to enhance revenue and improve 
resource allocation. The latter potential would follow if some institutional pricing 
autonomy encouraged differential salaries more reflective of market opportunities. 
Policy suggestion along these lines is not new, and interesting and relevant analysis is 
in both Miller and Pincus (1997) and Karmel (2001). An example of how it might 
work is offered below.  
A critical issue concerns the extent to which universities should be free to set prices.  
There are four important reasons to be concerned about unfettered price competition 
between Australian universities. The first is that the extent to which institutions will 
be able to benefit from price discretion will be a result of their location and history. 
For example, the Universities of Sydney, Western Australia, Adelaide and Melbourne 
are located in prime areas of their respective cities, and this gives them a significant 
commercial advantage. The fact that universities do not pay rent means that the 
playing field is not level.  
Second, an important part of universities’ relative standing is the result of many years 
of public subsidy. Reputations have been built up from these subsidies, implying that 
there might be important rents accruing to some universities from unfettered price 
competition. In turn this suggests that the alleged benefits of competition could be 
undermined without close attention to these issues of both geography and history. 
                                                            
18 Whether or not this is desirable in terms of economic theory depends on the subjective valuation 
given to the value of externalities. However, it would seem to be the case that the potential for large 
changes in this context are limited.  11
The first two reasons suggest that allowing completely free market principles in the 
pricing of higher education services in Australia is currently inappropriate, and will 
likely lead to significant economic rents accruing to well-placed and highly reputable 
institutions. These concerns could be resolved in part through movements towards 
universities compensating the public sector for these advantages, but there seems to 
be little contemporary discussion of this issue. 
There are two additional reasons for not allowing unfettered pricing flexibility, and 
both are related to the charge burdens on students. One is that it is difficult to believe 
that the current HECS levels are markedly below what they should be. In some cases 
currently, Law for example, it is very likely that students are paying more than the 
teaching costs involved. Full price discretion would suggest that such examples are 
likely to become commonplace. This rest uneasily with economic theory, which 
suggests that activities associated with spillover social benefits should be subsidised 
by taxpayers; in other words, that students should pay less than the full costs of the 
activity. 
Finally, there will be some level of HECS above which it is not feasible to collect the 
debt – former students will simply run out of time while earning. Recent re-
estimations have been undertaken of lifetime HECS repayments of the form first 
presented in Chapman (1997).
19  
The calculations used the 1995 ABS Income Distribution and Household Survey, 
updated for 2001 wage levels. They showed that the average female graduate, 
working full-time, could not repay more than $60,000 from age 22 to age 60. This 
suggests also that a very large number of women would repay less than this figure, 
since many women work part-time in their lifetimes, and for even those in the full-
time labour force many will earn less than the average. 
For average male graduates the story is brighter with respect to HECS collections, 
since men earn considerably more than women over their lifetimes. It was further 
found that the average male graduate could repay $100,000 in debt, and that this 
would take around 31 years or so. 
A solution would be to make the HECS repayment parameters less generous, but it is 
not credible to suggest that there is currently scope for this. 
A misguided suggestion from some is the imposition of a real rate of interest on the 
debt. Several points need to be noted in this context.  
First, HECS already has a rate of interest greater than the rate of inflation. That is, 
those choosing to repay HECS through the tax system rather than up-front, pay 33.33 
per cent higher in nominal terms, given that there is a 25 per cent discount for an up-
front payment. As well, since there is a 15 per cent discount for early repayments after 
HECS loans are undertaken, this conception of a rate of interest above the inflation 
rate is reinforced over a graduate’s repayment period. 
Second, there are strong reasons to prefer the current form of the HECS rate of 
interest to a simpler scheme which adds a further five per cent per year, for example, 
                                                            
19  These estimates were undertaken by Bruce Chapman and Tony Salvage in July 2002. The data, 
method and results are available from the author.  12
to the sum of unpaid debt. All workers face uncertain future income streams, meaning 
that a conventional real rate of interest on a HECS debt is associated with the 
possibility of rapidly growing financial obligations beyond the control of HECS 
debtors. The current HECS discount arrangements are thus much safer for borrowers 
than would be the alternative.  
Finally, adding a conventional real rate of interest onto the HECS debt will be 
equivalent to increasing the charge in real terms by about 30 per cent. But it is critical 
to record that the relative increase will be much higher for relatively poor graduates 
than it will be for those earning higher incomes. That is, recent calculations reveal that 
for an average female graduate paying HECS with no discounts, a real rate of interest 
of 5 per cent increases the cost of HECS by 38 per cent. However, for an average 
male graduate the increase will be only 18 per cent. 
Further, with a real rate of interest those with the capacity to pay up-front will then be 
receiving a very large bonus not available to relatively poor students without the 
capacity to do so. Overall, a conventional real rate of interest imposed on HECS will 
clearly be a strong movement towards inequity and regressivity. The suggestion has 
practically nothing going for it. 
 
.  The Necessity of Universal Income Contingent Repayment 
 
A critical price flexibility issue concerns the nature of student payment of differential 
charges. It is that all financing reforms have to be underpinned by universal access to 
an income contingent payment system, such as HECS. As explained and stressed in 
above, any financing arrangements involving mandatory payment of up-front fees - 
even with scholarships or other concessions - constitute poor policy from either a 
social or economic perspective.  
 
The same point applies to expenditures associated with enrolling in university, such as 
for books and other learning materials, and union fees. All of these should be covered 
with an option for students to borrow through HECS, repaying an additional 33.33 per 
cent in nominal terms as is the case for HECS tuition charges. 
 
The essential point implies that those arrangements currently in place allowing some 
institutional charging flexibility - such as full up-front fees for some undergraduates 
and indeed, with respect to TAFE charges
20 - are in need of change.  
 
TAFE funding reform towards consistency with higher education need not be radical. 
One way of going about this would be to apply a HECS-type option only to courses 
with strict accreditation to universities. Students could be allowed to pay up-front the 
current charge, or to take a HECS loan and repay through the tax system an additional 
33.33 per cent as is currently the case for university HECS. Maintaining current 




                                                            
20  Up-front charges currently exist for Associate Diplomas in TAFE, and many of these Diplomas can 
be used for accreditation for undergraduate degrees for which students pay HECS. This anomaly is 
in need of close attention (Chapman (1997b)).  13
 
 
.  How Institutional Price Autonomy Reform Could Work 
 
Existing arrangements could be modified to incorporate some price flexibility and 
revenue autonomy for universities, all necessarily with an income contingent 
repayment basis. While many variations are possible, the following example is 
offered for discussion. 
 
The idea is most easily comprehended if we start with the concept of 'standard' levels 
of HECS, representing the amount that the Commonwealth expects to recover from 
each student in a funded place in each course category. Universities would set their 
level of charges involving a small margin above the standard HECS levels. The 
Government should limit the extent of the additional charge to a maximum of, say, 25 
per cent above the standard level. The additional component could be referred to as a 
'premium HECS'. 
 
A student enrolling in a course with a premium HECS charge could choose to pay the 
premium (the extra) up-front, in which case the funds would be retained 
unconditionally by the university. 
 
If, as is likely, the premium is deferred and collected through HECS, the adjustment 
to a university's funding could then be handled relatively simply through current 
operating grant arrangements. DETYA would compare the expected HECS liability of 
each student (based on ‘standard’ HECS) with the actual liability recorded in each 
year of a student’s enrolment. Where the amount is greater, because premium HECS 
has been levied, the university's operating grant would be increased by a 
corresponding amount in the subsequent year. The government would receive this 
back through HECS. 
 
In the above case there is more revenue than is now the case, with the major 
distinction with respect to current arrangements being that the institution has more 
autonomy with respect to the use of its resources. However, variations of current 
policy in this direction do not necessarily mean that student imposts have to increase, 
even if the HECS charge is greater. This apparent conundrum can be understood 
through recognition of the critical role played by the HECS repayment rules. That is, 
nominal charge increases - and the associated additional direct revenue received by a 
university in the above example - could be accompanied by changes in repayment 
arrangements that effectively lower students’ debt liabilities. For example, higher 
income threshold and/or lower percentage repayments at low levels of income will 
have the effect of reducing the net present value of the debt. There might well be a 
case for such changes to the current repayment rules independently of the moves 
towards price flexibility suggested above. 
 
There is also no reason why a university should not be free to set its HECS rates 
below the standard rate in some or all courses, perhaps in order to capture a niche 
market. In this case, an institution’s operating grant would be adjusted downward 
using the same approach. In practice, it is likely that a total standard HECS liability 
would be calculated for each university and compared with the total actual HECS 
liability incurred.  14
 
There are many different ways of thinking about increased institutional autonomy 
with respect to financing that preserve and protect the critical role of income 
contingent repayment. The best analyses are to be found in Pincus and Miller (1997) 
and Karmel (2001). 
 
 
3 (d)  PELS 
 
.  The Recent Plan Explained and Motivated 
 
In January 2001 the government announced, as part of its Innovation Statement, that 
an income contingent loan would soon be available to all fee-paying non-research 
postgraduate students to cover current up-front charges. In a subsequent interview
21 
the Minister, David Kemp, offered details of the new scheme. 
 
The main features are: there will be no limits on the amount a student can borrow; the 
loan would be repaid according to the current HECS arrangements; and universities 
would remain free to set postgraduate charges. 
 
As stressed above, there are very good reasons for an income contingent charge 
mechanism for postgraduate degrees. Allowing the payment of up-front fees with the 
use of HECS-style loans will increase the access of the relatively disadvantaged to 
postgraduate studies. This will have the two important effects of increasing the pool 
of talent available for postgraduate studies and expanding the access of the system to 
the less privileged. 
 
In principle, this policy change should be applauded. Moves away from up-front fees 
and towards income contingent repayment reflect correct principles of reform for the 
Australian higher education system. There are some interesting issues with respect to 
the form of this particular proposal, however.  
 
 
.  Some Implications of PELS for Postgraduate Charge Levels 
 
The former Minister argued that competition would restrict the extent to which 
universities would commensurately increase postgraduate fees, saying: “We’re not 
expecting that there will be any significant change in fees as a result… ”. However, 
this is more complicated than is apparent. 
 
In analysing the implications of this policy change it is critical to recognise that the 
postgraduate charge facing a student who can pay with an interest-free loan is 
necessarily different to the fee received by the university. This is because the 
university receives the money at the time of enrolment, but the student repays the debt 
later. Critically, the absence of a real rate of interest on the debt means that in 
financial terms the student will necessarily be facing a lower impost than the actual 
charge. In other words, there will be a government-financed subsidy. 
 
                                                            
21  Interview with David Kemp, The Australian, 6th February, 2001.  15
The extent of the subsidy depends on how long before the student begins to repay the 
postgraduate loan, and the length of time taken to repay it once repayments begin. 
That is, among other things, the subsidy depends on students’ expected future 
incomes and the level of outstanding HECS undergraduate debt at the time the 
postgraduate loan is taken. The latter is critical because the postgraduate obligation 
will only start to be repaid once other HECS obligations have been met. 
 
For example, students starting a postgraduate qualification when they have relatively 
large undergraduate HECS’ debt will have a long period of subsidised benefit, and 
thus will implicitly face a relatively small charge in true financial terms. On the other 
hand, postgraduate students with no HECS debts, and already earning incomes above 
the repayment threshold, will receive relatively small subsidies.  
 
Unambiguously, however, if the nominal size of the charge remains unchanged, the 
new scheme financially benefits all students taking the loan. This has a very important 
implication for a university’s postgraduate pricing policy in the context of the 
government allowing complete postgraduate fee flexibility. What then is likely to 
happen? 
 
The answer is that because these new arrangements mean that the effective charges 
faced by some students are now lower than before, universities will be able to 
increase the fee charged. Importantly, these fee increases, while real for the 
university, are not in fact true increases for students who can defer payment since they 
have access to the (real) interest-free loan.  
 
The existence of competition between the universities will have limited impact on the 
above. After all, all universities will have the benefit of students now facing lower 
true charges, and the system will deliver new nominal charges reflecting this fact. 
 
With the presumed higher charges the universities will be unambiguously better off, 
since they will be receiving the additional revenue at the time of student enrolment. 
Prospective postgraduate students are also likely to be advantaged, but the extent of 
their benefit will be determined by how large the presumed nominal fee increases turn 
out to be. The costs of the subsidy will be financed by the public sector. 
 
.  Estimates of the Subsidy 
 
An obvious way to work out the size of the subsidies implicit in the new postgraduate 
policy approach is through the application of human capital techniques with respect to 
the net present value of charges under the planned arrangements. This is now reported 
from the use of cross-sectional data with information on individuals’ age, earnings, 
education and sex. 
 
The 1994/95 ABS Income Distribution Survey is an apposite data set available to 
address the issue. For this exercise some simple counter-factuals have to be defined. 
The first is as follows. 
 
Imagine that a person has completed a four-year undergraduate degree begun at age 
18 and completed at age 22. A middle-range HECS debt would be $19,720. Further, it  16
is assumed that the student chooses to undertake two extra years of postgraduate study 
for which there is a charge of $5,000 per year. 
 
Our hypothetical students will have the benefit of not paying any real interest on the 
additional debt until their existing HECS debt is repaid. Assuming that they earn the 
average incomes of men and women with a higher degree (the earnings profiles being 
shown in Appendix 1) it is possible to illustrate when the repayments occur, and these 
are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1  
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The data show that for the examples chosen men and women will start to repay the 
postgraduate loan at ages 31 and 32, and will finish the repayments at ages 33 and 36 
respectively. These data can be converted into calculations of the net present value of 
the charges, calculated at age 22. The results can be compared to the NPV of the 
charges paid up-front to calculate the implicit subsidy, now shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
NPV of a  $10,000 Postgraduate Debt, HECS Unpaid 
 
  Men Women 
NPV of the debt  $5,941.85   $5,329 




The data from Table 1 show that for some students there is a very large subsidy 
implicit in the Government’s plan: of the order of 41-47 per cent. 
 
Two other examples are now presented. They are for men and women with no HECS 
debts, undertaking postgraduate two-year degrees which they begin to repay at ages 
24 and 34, while earning the predicted incomes for postgraduates of those at ages. The 




NPV of a $10,000 Postgraduate Debt, HECS Paid 
 
 Men  Women 
Scenario 1: Paid HECS, Postgraduate 







Implicit subsidy (per cent)  18.6  20.3 
Scenario 2: Paid HECS, Postgraduate 







Implicit subsidy (per cent)  17.3  19.5 
 
 
The subsidies of around 17-20 per cent are much lower than would be the case for 
students with high outstanding undergraduate HECS debts. Also, note that a very 
large number of current postgraduate students are both part-time and aged over 30, 
implying strongly that they are full-time workers already earning over the HECS 
repayment threshold. For these students the subsidies will be somewhat lower than for 
Scenario 2
22, and for other prospective students there will be no subsidy at all
23. 
 
Even given that there is a large range of subsidies, and accepting that for many 
students already in employment these subsidies will be low, it is still the case that on 
average under the new system effective charges will be lower than before. Thus the 
tendency will be to increase the pressure for universities to increase (nominal) 
postgraduate charges. Since all universities will face similar increases in the effective 
demand for their services from the new arrangements, the role of competitive forces is 
unlikely to diminish the likelihood of charge increases. The critical issue is that, if this 






                                                            
 
23  For those students who currently pay the up-front fee to qualify for a self-education tax deduction 
there will be no subsidy.  18
.  The Consequences of Charge increases 
 
There are important policy questions raised by the very real likelihood of universities 
increasing postgraduate charges as a consequence of the subsidy implicit in the new 
arrangements. The first point is that higher charges mean an even greater level of 
subsidy, since the additions to the loan will be repaid even later. Higher charges mean 
both higher levels of and higher proportionate subsidies
24. 
 
In response to this budgetary issue a government would have several options. One 
possibility, already raised publicly, is that the increases in nominal postgraduate 
charges could result in the government capping the amount that a student can borrow. 
This would arguably be the least desirable response, given the real possibility that 
such a capping would end being below the subsequent charge for many students, 
meaning that up-front fees would still then exist, but in a different (top-up) form.  
 
Second, the government could cap the charge levels (keeping no restrictions on 
borrowing), which would essentially be an extension of differential HECS introduced 
in 1997. Such an approach would be better than the first option, since it would keep 
intact an income contingent method of payment with no possibility for top-up up-front 
fees. However, neither of the above responses adequately addresses the subsidy level 
implicit in the new arrangements. 
 
There is a strikingly easy way of addressing the subsidy issue, now explained. The 
subsidy can be redressed through the introduction of a discount for up-front payment. 
The discount could be set at 25 per cent, which would make it consistent with 
undergraduate HECS, and is also a reasonable approximation of the overall subsidy of 
the postgraduate loans scheme. Making it work would be straightforward: the 
university sets the fee (to a maximum level set by government?), and those preferring 
to delay payment incur an obligation to the government which is then 33.33 per cent 
higher than the fee paid by the government to the university on enrolment. 
 
 
  .  PELS and Private Institutions 
 
Legislation is currently being considered to extend PELS to some private colleges and 
to Bond University. The politics of this issue is complex, but the economics is simple. 
That is, all the analysis above concerning the extent of government subsidies and their 
implications for higher nominal charges apply identically to private institutions.  
 
The important economic point for the debate concerning PELS being made available 
to institutions outside the public sector concerns the existence and the extent of the 
subsidies. The analysis presented above makes highly visible the fact that PELS - as 
currently designed - for the private sector means taxpayer transfers to these 
institutions, and these will likely be around 20-40 per cent of nominal charges. A 
different way of thinking about the economics of this would be for the government to 
recover the taxpayer subsidy through charging these institutions for the benefit of 
their use of the HECS collection mechanism. 
 
                                                            
24  We have worked out that the subsidy for a 32 year old undertaking a postgraduate two year degree 
costing $10,000 is around 20 per cent, but this rises to over 30 per cent for a charge of $30,000.  19
. Conclusion 
 
The Government’s recent announcement that income-contingent loans will be made 
available to assist postgraduates to pay fees is a productive development in Australian 
higher education financing policy. To the extent that it means the demise of up-front 
fees it will improve access for prospective postgraduate students, and will as a result 
mean that there will be less wasted educational talent and a better workforce. It will 
also improve significantly the opportunities for poorer prospective students. 
 
However, because the new scheme entails the use of an interest-free loan, this implies 
that a sizeable proportion of students will receive a government subsidy; this will 
increase effective demand for the service. This is likely to facilitate nominal charge 
increases, meaning that universities will receive higher charge revenues. The 
government will thus be subsidising both students and universities more than 
currently.  
 
It is of interest that a reasonable response to this issue would be the offering of a 25 
per cent discount for those paying up-front, which is the way undergraduate HECS 
works. In practice this would be straightforward: the government would pay the fee to 
the university for the student and the student would agree to repay through the tax 
system a nominal sum which is 25 per cent higher. 
 
 
4 The  Bottom  Line 
 
University financing issues currently require important attention and change. The 
system is experiencing significant stress. 
 
With respect to allowing the maintenance of earnings matching average Australian 
wage increases, public sector outlays have been falling. These falls are above and 
beyond what has occurred with the justifiable switch in financial contributions from 
taxpayers to students. Those arguing for some restoration of government support have 
a point. 
 
There might be partial remedies to the situation through some increased price 
flexibility for universities. Movements in this direction should recognise that some of 
the benefits entail additional resources being made unconditionally available to the 
particular higher education institution. As well, for important reasons outlined, the 
case for price discretion is not a case for full institutional charge flexibility. 
Significant limits need to be placed on the extent of price discretion; this suggests that 
changes in this direction are unlikely to be the panacea to current funding dilemmas. 
 
HECS has worked well, and is in both theory and practice the correct student charge 
funding mechanism. There are limits to how much HECS charges can be increased, 
and we are arguably very close to the limits currently. But HECS could easily be 
extended as a facility to include direct student costs, and as an option for a small 
number of courses in higher education accredited TAFE courses.  
 
Other than this, HECS does not need revision, although some decreases in repayment 
percentages could usefully accompany prospects of a small increase in the charge  20
level. However, no more than a small increase in the charge is justified, and the notion 
that the debt requires a real interest rate reflects a poor understanding of the 
economics of the matter. 
 
PELS is a significant improvement over previous postgraduate charge arrangements. 
There will be two implications: it will result in both higher nominal charges and 
increased revenue for many higher education institutions. But down the track there is 
likely to emerge pressure for changes to PELS. If this happens, arguably the most 
sensible option would be to make PELS consistent with HECS by allowing a 25 per 
cent discount for an up-front payment. And even in this context there are reasons for 





















Source: Derived from the 1994/95 Income Distribution Survey. The profiles have 
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